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Children and Metaphors
Abstract
Recent research on the development of children's abilities to
comprehend and produce metaphorical language is reviewed. It is
argued that this research supports the view that the ability to
produce and comprehend metaphorical language emerges out of
children's undifferentiated similarity notions and develops
gradually to encompass a greater variety of conceptual domains.
Although we do not yet have adequate theories of how metaphor
comprehension or production develop, there is good reason to
believe that this is a continuous, rather than a stage-like
process, and that it is constrained primarily by limitations in
children's knowledge and information processing abilities.
Furthermore, it appears that the comprehension and production of
metaphorical language involves transfer of knowledge from one
conceptual domain to another which, on the one hand, depends
critically on the conceptual knowledge the child already has, but
on the other acts to enrich and advance this conceptual
knowledge.
Children and Metaphors
During the last decade we have witnessed a proliferation of
research on metaphor. This research has changed many of our
ideas about how metaphoric competence develops and about the
cognitive and linguistic skills that allow this development to
take place. For example, while just a few years ago it was
believed that elementary school children are incapable of
understanding metaphors, it is now widely accepted that
metaphoric understanding emerges during the preschool years and
develops gradually to encompass a greater variety of metaphorical
expressions. The purpose of this paper is to describe the
research that has brought about these changes, to summarize
current trends, and to identify areas for future research. The
focus of the review is on general developmental processes. The
question of individual differences in metaphoric competence and
their relation to creativity is not discussed. A recent review
of the literature on this latter topic can be found in Kogan
(1983).
We start with a discussion of the literature on metaphor
production. Since children produce utterances that have the
appearance of being metaphorical as soon as they start talking,
it is important to define the criteria for deciding whether such
child utterances are metaphors. In this paper it is suggested
that metaphors involve the juxtaposition or comparison of
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concepts belonging to different adult conventional categories and
that in order for a child utterance to qualify as a metaphor we
must show that the child (a) can form conventional categories,
and (b) is capable of overriding these categories to see
similarity between things that are not really similar, but "sort
of" similar. It is argued that contrary to Piaget's (1962)
claims, the current empirical evidence supports the view that by
4 years children can distinguish literal from nonliteral
similarity, and therefore are capable, in principle, of producing
and comprehending metaphorical language. To the extent that a
given child metaphor represents a true metaphor or not depends,
however, on the particular conceptual domains involved and the
child's awareness of the similarities and differences between
these domains.
Next, the early literature on metaphor comprehension is
reviewed and some of its methodological limitations are
discussed. It is argued that the current empirical evidence
supports the position that the beginnings of metaphor
comprehension emerge during the preschool years but that this
development is not complete until the late childhood years, when
the child's conceptual and linguistic knowledge approximates that
of the adult's. Although we do not yet have good theories of the
development of metaphor comprehension, recent research seems to
indicate that this is a continuous rather than a stage-like
process and that it is greatly influenced by variables such as,
the content of the metaphor, the linguistic form in which it is
expressed, and the context in which it occurs. Particular
importance is paid to the content of the metaphor for it is quite
unlikely that a metaphor will be understood if it compares
concepts children (or adults) know little about. Some proposals
about how conceptual knowledge influences the development of
metaphoric competence are discussed. We conclude by suggesting
that instead of seeing metaphor as the result of the immature
thinking of the preconceptual child, we can conceptualize it as
the reflection on the language of an underlying transfer of
knowledge from one conceptual domain to another, similar to the
transfer of knowledge that takes place in adults.
Metaphor Production
Are "Child" Metaphors "Real" Metaphors?
Almost as soon as they start to talk children produce
utterances that have the superficial appearance of a metaphor
(e.g., Carlson & Anisfeld, 1969; Chukovsky, 1968; Clark, 1973;
Piaget, 1962; Werner & Kaplan, 1967). For example, according to
Winner, McCarthy, Kleinman & Gardner (1979), a 26-month-old child
exclaimed "corn, corn!" pointing to a yellow plastic baseball
hat, while an 18-month-old child called a toy car "a snake" while
twisting it up his mother's arm. Carlson's 24-month-old son said
"Cup swimming," while pushing a cup along in the bath water, and
"I'm a big waterfall," while sliding down from his father
(Carlson & Anisfeld, 1969). Finally, Piaget's (1962) daughter
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Jacheline said (between the ages of 3;6 and 4;7) of a bent twig,
"It's like a machine for putting in petrol," of a caddis-fly in a
stream, "It's an insect in its cage," and of a winding river,
"It's like a snake."
Utterances such as these are known as "child metaphors"
because they violate the conventions of reference (they refer to
things by a name different from their literal names), or because
they make a comparison between two objects that belong to
different conventional categories. The question for the
developmental psychologist is whether these "child metaphors" are
"real metaphors" comparable to the ones produced by adults. Here
researchers disagree. Some argue that child metaphors are
nothing more than the result of accidents or errors of
categorization (e.g., Chukovsky, 1968; Matter & Davis, 1975) or
the product of the symbolic, imagistic type of thinking
characteristic of the preoperational child (Piaget, 1962).
Others claim that child metaphors represent the conscious
violation of an established category and thus that they are truly
metaphorical (Billow, 1981; Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer, & Wolf,
1978). These differing positions are based on conflicting views
about (a) the nature of metaphor, (b) young children's
classification abilities, and (c) the criteria for defining child
utterances as metaphorical.
The nature of metaphor. Historically, there have been three
views on the nature of metaphor: according to the substitution
theory metaphor involves the substitution of a literal expression
(Richard is brave) with a metaphorical one (Richard is a lion);
according to the comparison theory it involves the assertion of a
similarity or comparison between two terms--the topic (Richard)
and the term used metaphorically, usually called the vehicle
(lion); and according to the interaction theory the relationship
between the two terms in a metaphor is an interaction that allows
the topic to be seen from the perspective of one's knowledge
about the vehicle. All three theories have been criticized on
various grounds and, in recent years, have undergone a number of
modifications which have reduced their differences substantially
(e.g., see Ortony, 1979; Tourangeau & Sternberg, 1981, 1982; and
Verbrugge & McCarrell, 1977 for a more extensive discussion of
these issues).
Rather than getting embroiled in a complicated philosophical
debate, we chose here to take a position on this issue and to
make clear how we view metaphors. In our view metaphors are
meaningful statements which communicate something about a concept
by comparing it or juxtaposing it to a similar concept from a
different conventional category. There are two aspects of this
definition which are of particular importance. First, the two
concepts which are compared or juxtaposed must be based on some
perceptible similarity, otherwise the statement would be an
anomaly, not a metaphor. Second, the two concepts must belong to
different conventional categories, otherwise the statement would
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represent a literal comparison, not a metaphor. Metaphoricity,
according to this definition, depends primarily on "domain
incongruence"--whether the two concepts involved in the metaphor
come from different conventional categories.
One problem with such a definition is that the boundaries
between what may be considered as a conventional vs. a non-
conventional adult category are not well defined. In addition,
as Sternberg and his colleagues have shown, metaphoricity also
depends on the remoteness of the categories to which the topic
and the vehicle belong. The less remote these categories are,
the less metaphorical a statement is judged (Sternberg,
Tourangeau, & Nigro, 1979; Tourangeau & Sternberg, 1981, 1982).
Thus, there can be borderline cases where adults may disagree on
whether a statement can be called metaphorical or not.1
The literal/metaphorical distinction becomes even more
problematic, however, when dealing with child utterances. There,
one must demonstrate not only that the topic and vehicle belong
to different and remote conventional categories, but also that
the child has formed the conceptual categories the metaphor
violates, and is aware that this violation is taking place.
Developmental psychologists disagree on whether they should
attribute metaphoric competence to preschool children either
because they believe that children are not capable of forming
conceptual categories similar to those formed by adults (e.g.,
Piaget, 1962), or because they employ different criteria for
deciding whether a given utterance is metaphorical or not (e.g.,
Billow, 1981; Winner, 1979).
Children's classification skills. According to the argument
advanced by Piaget (1962) and researchers working within a
Piagetian framework (Cometa & Eson, 1978; Elkind, 1970; Matter &
Davis, 1975; Ricco & Overton, 1985), preschool children are
incapable of producing metaphors, because they are incapable of
forming the conceptual categories which metaphors are supposed to
violate. Piaget argues that preschool children think in terms of
preconcepts based on action schemata and symbolic images and not
in terms of true concepts "defined by the objective qualities of
the objects themselves" and in which "there is inclusion of an
object in a class and of one class in another" (p. 220). Thus,
the metaphor-like utterances of the preschooler are not based on
the violation of stable categories but rather on the perception
of similarity between individual elements. It follows that these
utterances do not represent real metaphors, and that the
production of real metaphors must await the development of the
concrete logical operations which allow a hierarchical conceptual
system to be formed.
In recent years Piaget's views have come under heavy attack.
First the "classical" view of concepts (that is, that concepts
can be characterized in terms of a hierarchical organization of
classes and that all instances of a class share common properties
that are necessary conditions for their definition), on which
Children and Metaphors
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Piaget has based his theory of conceptual development has been
challenged. Many adult concepts cannot be defined in terms of
common properties but only in terms of family resemblances
(Fodor, 1981; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Medin, 1981;
Wittgenstein, 1953). Indeed, according to Rosch and Mervis'
(1975) prototype theory, much of adult thinking could be
characterized as "preconceptual" according to Piagetian standards
(see also Rosch, 1983).
Second, while preschool children do have difficulties with
Piagetian class-inclusion tasks, the ability to classify objects
hierarchically seems to emerge much earlier than originally
thought. Work by Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch, Mervis, Gay,
Boyes-Braem, & Johnson, 1976) has distinguished a superordinate
from a less abstract, basic level of categorization. Unlike most
classification experiments which used objects belonging to a
superordinate category, Rosch et al. (1976) showed that children
as young as 3 years of age could sort objects according to a
consistent criterion if they belonged to a basic category. Since
then, it has been shown that even 1 1/2 year olds may be capable
of taxonomic groupings at the basic level (Ross, 1980; Sugarman,
1979).
Obviously, the literature on the development of
classification is too complex and diverse to be presented here in
any detail (see Carey, 1983; Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983; and
Mandler, 1983; for a discussion of these issues). There is
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general agreement, however, that the ability to construct
consistent and exhaustive classes starts quite early in life and
develops to encompass more complex stimuli as the child's
knowledge of the world and information processing capacities
increase. Such a view of the development of classification
skills entails that preschool children may be aware that some
comparisons violate category boundaries and thus that they are
metaphorical.
Contrary to Piaget's claims, it thus appears that preschool
children may well be capable, in principle, of producing and
understanding metaphorical language. From that, it does not
necessarily follow that all child utterances that appear
metaphorical from an adult point of view are metaphors. One
needs to develop criteria to distinguish utterances based on
literal similarity from those based on nonliteral similarity.
Only recently have such criteria been developed and applied to
empirical data.
Criteria for deciding whether a given child utterance is
metaphorical. In one study, Billow (1981) followed 73
preschoolers (between 2.7 to 6.0 years) during regular school
days, recording all utterances which referred to an object,
feeling, or event by a term which would not ordinarily be used
for that referent. These utterances were then scored as
metaphors if they were based on perceptible similarity. For
instance, if a child used the word "grass" to refer to a green
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carpet, she was credited with the production of a metaphor based
on the perceptual similarity between grass and green carpets.
Most of the utterances that appeared metaphorical were based on
similarity, and were thus scored as metaphors. Only about 6% of
the utterances were judged to have been based on possible errors
of reference.
The results of this study suggest that child metaphors are
deliberate and meaningful rather than accidental or anomalous.
However, the definitional problem remains. Billow did not
demonstrate that the children were aware that their utterances
violated conventional categories, and thus, that they
distinguished literal from nonliteral similarity. The perception
of similarity alone does not justify calling an utterance
metaphorical. For example, we know from recent research that
even 12 month old infants are capable of seeing similarity
between events in different sensory modalities, like a high/low
tone and a tall/short line, but we do not know that they override
habitual modes of classification in doing so (Wagner, Winner,
Cicchetti, & Gardner, 1981). The critical question is not
whether young children can see similarity between superficially
dissimilar objects and events, but whether they can distinguish
literal from metaphorical similarity.
According to Winner and her colleagues (Winner, 1979;
Winner, McCarthy, & Gardner, 1980; and Winner, McCarthy, Kleinman,
& Gardner, 1979), the first step towards deciding whether a child
utterance is a metaphor requires distinguishing overextensions
from renamings. Overextensions represent instances where a known
word is used to refer to an object whose conventional name the
child does not yet know. Renamings represent the instances where
the child already knows how an object is named but chooses to
call it something else. Winner and her colleagues argued that
only renamings qualify as metaphors. Overextensions cannot be
cconsidered as metaphors because they do not indicate an
intention from the part of the child to make a nonliteral
comparison.
Winner et al. (1979, 1980) developed criteria to distinguish
overextensions from renamings and applied these criteria to the
analysis of the spontaneous speech of one child (between the ages
of 27 and 58 months) as well as to the elicited speech of
children (ranging in age from 3 to 10 years) participating in a
game of renaming. An utterance was called a renaming if the
experimenter had information that the child knew the literal name
of the item that was referred to metaphorically, or if the
child's gestures indicated that she was in a pretend mode (the
assumption being that in this case there was an intention on the
part of the child to use language nonliterally). Otherwise, the
utterance was considered to be an overextension, and therefore
not metaphorical. Since 72% of the spontaneous apparent
metaphors and 66% of the elicited ones were judged to be
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renamings or pretend comparisons, Winner concluded that these
utterances represented genuine metaphors.
Unfortunately, the distinction between overextensions and
renamings does not solve the problem of distinguishing literal
from nonliteral utterances. First, while overextensions do not
demonstrate an intent from the part of the child to make a
nonliteral comparison, they could qualify as genuine metaphors if
the child was aware of the fact that a conventional category was
being violated. Indeed, many adult metaphors which are used to
express an idea for which an appropriate literal term cannot be
easily found or does not exist, could be seen as overextensions.
According to Ortony (1975), metaphors are "necessary and not just
nice" precisely because they make it possible to communicate
ideas which are difficult to express in literal language. In the
history of language, metaphors were often created to fill gaps in
the lexicon; that is probably why metaphor is so pervasive
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Children may be motivated to use
overextensions because they often find themselves in situations
of inexpressibility (Marschark & Nall, in press), but they may be
aware of the category violations involved. What is needed is not
to automatically exclude overextensions from consideration as
metaphors, but to develop criteria for distinguishing literal
from nonliteral overextensions.
Second, renamings may not necessarily be metaphorical. In a
renaming the child may simply intend to indicate that the two
objects being compared are literally similar, instead of being
"sort of" similar. What seems to be needed is the additional
information that the child who uses a renaming is aware that
these two objects belong to different conceptual domains.
Finally, the decision to call metaphors all pretend
renamings occurring in the context of symbolic play is not
without problems, either. Winner (1979) claims that "if one is
willing to grant symbolic status to the object substitutions of
what is typically called symbolic play, then one must accept the
accompanying renamings as nonliterally intended. Whether the
child knows the literal name of the misnamed object is
irrelevant" (p. 477). While we agree with Winner that there is
something fundamentally nonliteral about symbolic play, calling
pretend renamings metaphors obscures fundamental differences
between these two types of utterances. In our view pretend
renamings could be best conceptualized as precursors to metaphor
because, like metaphors, are based on children's tendencies to
impose a familiar schema on the object world. They are different
from metaphors, however, in the following respects.
First, metaphors involve the comparison and juxtaposition of
concepts, whereas pretend renamings are intended to change the
identity of the real object itself. When a child calls a block a
"cup," he or she is not referring to any conceptual similarities
between blocks and cups, but intents to use the block as
something to drink out from. Second, metaphors have a
15
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communicative intent which is missing from pretend renamings.
During play, an object is renamed to fit the pretend schema, not
to communicate anything about the object itself. Take the
example of the 18-month-old who called a toy car "a snake"
(Winner, et al., 1980). Obviously, this child was not trying to
communicate anything about toy cars in this instance. Third,
metaphors are based on similarity, whereas similarity is not a
necessary characteristic of pretend renamings. In half of the
pretend action metaphors identified by Winner, there was no
perceptible similarity between the actual object and its
renaming. Such renamings are totally meaningless outside the
specific pretend play schema in which they occur and could hardly
be called metaphors. Finally, as Gardner and Winner (1978)
themselves discuss, pretend play may not even represent the
conscious violation of reality. It is possible that for the
young child pretense may override reality with the pretend object
taking over the properties of the real one while the play act
lasts. In this case, of course, no metaphoric ability can be
deduced.
From the discussion so far it has become apparent that to
qualify as a metaphor a child utterance must (a) be based on some
perceptible similarity between the two juxtaposed objects, and
(b) there must be some evidence that the child distinguishes
literal from nonliteral similarity, i.e., that the child is aware
that the two objects belong to different conventional categories.
Children and Metaphors
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Vosniadou and Ortony (1983a) demonstrated this awareness by
examining the performance of 3- to 6-year olds in one of two
tasks. In a comparison task, children completed statements of
the form "A is like X" choosing one of two words from (a) a
metaphorical/literal pair (e.g., "Rain is like tears" vs. "Rain
is like snow"); (b) a literal/anomalous pair (e.g., "Rain is like
snow" vs. "Rain is like a chair"); or (c) a metaphorical/
anomalous pair (e.g., "Rain is like tears" vs. "Rain is like a
chair"). In a categorization task, children completed statements
of the form "A is the same kind of thing as X" choosing only from
a metaphorical/literal pair. Even the youngest children
preferred meaningful (literal or metaphorical) from anomalous
alternatives in both tasks, and by age 4, many children selected
the literal alternatives in the categorization task. For
example, while the metaphorical comparison "rain is like tears"
was the preferred one in the comparison task, most 4-year-olds
selected the literal comparison "rain is the same kind of thing
as snow" in the categorization task. Apparently, by 4 years
children can distinguish between a literal and a metaphorical
comparison when it involves familiar items. It is, of course,
possible that younger children could do better in tasks in which
the comparisons were embedded in a meaningful context, or in non-
verbal tasks, but that still remains to be seen.
A study by Mendelson, Robinson, Gardner, and Winner (1984)
is consistent with the claim that four-year-old children can
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distinguish literal from metaphorical comparisons. In this
study, 4- and 5-year-old children were given three choices from
which to select a match for a visual stimulus. The choices
represented either a conventional match, a metaphorical match, or
an unrelated match, and were presented either in a pictorial, a
verbal, or a picture-verbal condition. Children were more likely
to classify objects according to a conventional category than by
a visual similarity that cut across conventional categories
(e.g., were more likely to classify a cherry lollipop with a
chocolate bar than with a stop sign). Mendelson et al.
interpreted the results as indicating that preschoolers'
predominant mode of classification is conventional, and thus as
providing support to the argument that unconventional namings
(i.e., child metaphors) reflect intentional violations of
conventional categories.
While these results demonstrate that conventional modes of
classification are accessible to preschoolers, they should be
interpreted with caution. As Marschark and Nall (in press) note,
the demonstration of literal classification skills with one set
of materials in one context does not necessarily imply the
intentional violation of a conventional category with different
materials in another context. Although both the Mendelson et al.
(1984) and the Vosniadou and Ortony (1983a) studies demonstrate
that 4-5 year old children can, under some circumstances,
differentiate literal from metaphorical comparisons or exhibit
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literal classification skills, they do not demonstrate that all
children's utterances that appear to be metaphorical to an adult
were so intended by the children. This depends on the particular
conceptual domains that are involved and the child's awareness of
the similarities and differences between these domains. This
implies that a complete theory of metaphor production is
dependent on a theory of conceptual development, an issue which
will be discussed in greater detail in the third section of this
paper.
The roots of metaphoric competence. According to Winner et
al. (1980), there are two forms of metaphor; the "enactive"
metaphor that grows out of the actions of symbolic play and the
"perceptual" metaphor that arises out of the observance of
similarities between objects. A different possibility is that
there is just one form of metaphor, one that arises out of both
the perception of similarity and the actions of symbolic play.
Indeed, it appears that while the perception of similarity
and the actions of symbolic play have independent beginnings,
they eventually come together to give rise to similarity based
renamings at about the same time when we would expect children to
make the literal/nonliteral distinction. Children are capable of
perceiving similarity between objects, feelings and events from
very early on. The perception of these similarities is
fundamental for category formation and classification. In order
to produce a metaphor, however, the child must override habitual
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forms of categorization, and see similarity between objects and
events that are similar only in certain respects. In symbolic
play children start by overriding the conventional name of an
object and calling it something else. Originally it appears that
these pretend renamings are arbitrary, without concern for the
similarity between the object and its renaming, but become
increasingly constrained by similarity as the child develops.
According to Winner (1979), similarity based pretend renamings
increase from 25% at age two to 76% by age four in the
spontaneous speech of the child she studied. By that age there
is increasing evidence that children have become capable of
distinguishing between literal and nonliteral similarity.
Is there a decline in metaphor production with age? There
is some evidence that children's linguistic creativity decreases
with age (Billow, 1981; Gardner, Kirchner, Winner, & Perkins,
1975; Gardner et al., 1978; Pollio & Pollio, 1974). Billow
noticed a decline in the number of naturally occurring metaphors
among preschoolers with age, while Gardner et al. (1978) reported
that elementary school children often resisted attempts to engage
in the use of figurative language. Based on these findings,
Gardner and his associates (e.g., Gardner et al., 1978; Gardner &
Winner, 1978) have proposed that the development of metaphor
production follows a U-shaped curve: production of metaphor is
common during the preschool years, declines during the elementary
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school years (as children are consolidating the literal meaning
of words) and increases again with the advent of preadolescence.
It now appears that the apparent decline in metaphor
production with age may have been overestimated. For instance,
Pollio and Pollio (1974) observed that different estimates can be
obtained about elementary school children's use of figurative
language depending on the tasks employed. They found that third-,
fourth-, and fifth-grade students varied considerably both in
the amount and in the kind of figurative language they used in
three different tasks: a composition task (in which they wrote a
composition on a given topic), a multiple sentence task (in which
they produced as many sentences as possible with a set of five
words), and a comparison task (in which they found as many
similarities as possible between word pairs, like "clock" and
"child"). Winner, McCarthy, & Gardner (1980) also noted a
discrepancy in estimates of metaphor production obtained from
spontaneous utterances and those elicited under experimental
conditions and suggested that the literal stage may reflect more
a motivational rather than a competence problem.
Gardner's argument that there is a decline in metaphor
production with age rests on the assumption that all child
metaphors are real metaphors. If it is true, as we have argued
in this paper, that some child metaphors are not real metaphors
(either because they represent literal overextensions or non-
similarity based pretend renamings), then what appears to be a
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decline in metaphor production is maybe only a decline in the
proportion of utterances which appear metaphorical from the adult
point of view but are not real metaphors. Such an argument would
be consistent with the findings by Gardner et al. (1975) that the
number of appropriate metaphors (appropriate by adult standards)
produced by children increase with age.
To sum up, in order for a child utterance to qualify as a
real metaphor (a) it must be based on similarity, and (b) the
child must be aware of the category violation. It appears that
at least by the age of 4 children are capable of distinguishing
literal from nonliteral comparisons, and thus also capable of
producing metaphors. Metaphoric competence emerges out of
children's ability to see similarity between different objects
and events as well as out of children's tendency to impose
familiar schemas on the object world. Evidence for the first can
be found in preschool children's overextensions and perceptual
renamings, while evidence for the second can be found in their
action or pretend renamings. As children's conceptual knowledge
becomes organized in categories similar to those of adults,
children become more capable of distinguishing between literal
and nonliteral similarity, and thus of producing "true"
metaphors.
Needless to say, more research along the lines started by
Winner (1979) is needed to systematically investigate the kinds
of renamings and overextensions children produce in conjunction
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with the development of their symbolic play and classification
skills. The empirical evidence that we have so far is too slim
to allow any conclusive statements to be made about the emergence
of metaphoric competence. In addition to providing information
about the emergence of metaphor production and comprehension,
such an investigation would also provide important information
about conceptual development itself.
Metaphor Comprehension
The Emergence of Metaphoric Understanding
Early research on children's comprehension of metaphorical
language produced conflicting results. A few studies which
tested metaphor comprehension indirectly (i.e., using non-verbal
tasks in which children matched words to metaphorically related
pictures), suggested that preschool children can see similarity
between items belonging to different adult conceptual categories.
For example, Gardner (1974) demonstrated that 4-year-old children
could match pairs of polar adjectives ("loud-quiet") not only to
literal alternatives (e.g., loud and quiet sounds) but also to
metaphorical ones (e.g., pairs of colors, faces, etc.). In
addition, preschoolers were as able as adults to answer questions
like "If a tree had a knee where should it be?" by locating the
imaginary knee on the picture of a tree (Gentner, 1977).
But most of the early studies which tested the comprehension
of metaphorical language directly, that is, by using verbal tasks
which required children to paraphrase or explain a metaphorical
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expression, suggested that children below 10-12 years of age are
incapable of metaphor comprehension. For example, not until
about 14 years of age could Winner, Rosenstiel, and Gardner
(1976) find that children fully explain the meaning of
metaphorical sentences such as "The prison guard was a hard
rock." Similarly, Asch and Nerlove (1960) showed that only after
age 11 could children understand the dual function (physical or
psychological) of terms like "sweet" and "bright."
These results were generally consistent with the Piagetian
position (Piaget, 1962) that metaphoric competence is a late
development. Piaget's comments on metaphor applied to the
production rather than the comprehension of metaphorical language
but his general account has been extended to metaphor
comprehension. In one Piagetian experiment, Smith (1976)
selected metaphors from fifth-grade textbooks and asked 80 sixth-
and eighth-grade children to paraphrase them. According to
Smith, the poorest paraphrases showed characteristics of concrete
and pre-operational thinking, while the best showed
characteristics of formal-operational thought. In another
experiment, Billow (1975) made a distinction between similarity
metaphors ("Hair is spaghetti") and proportional metaphors ("My
head is an apple without a core"). Similarity metaphors, Billow
argued, are related to the ability to make classifications based
on shared attributes, an ability which is assumed by Inhelder and
Piaget (1964) to develop during the concrete operational stage.
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Proportional metaphors are based on the ability to make
classifications based on shared relations, an ability which is
assumed to develop during the stage of formal operations.
To test this hypothesis, Billow compared children's
paraphrases of similarity and proportional metaphors to their
performance on Piagetian concrete and formal operation tasks.
Performance on the proportional metaphors was strongly correlated
with performance on the combinatorial test that was assumed to
test formal operations, but only about half of the children who
understood the similarity metaphors were successful on the
classification task assumed to test formal operations. Billow
concluded that while comprehension of proportional metaphors is
related to the emergence of formal operations, comprehension of
similarity metaphors precedes the concrete operational stage.
Cometa and Eson (1978) criticized Billow's (1975) study on
the grounds that the use of verbal classification tasks resulted
in underestimating children's logical skills. Verbal
classification tasks are more difficult than non-verbal ones,
according to Cometa and Eson, because they depend not only on
certain logical operations but also on language experience.
Thus, the children in Billow's study who were able to comprehend
metaphors probably had the logical operations characteristic of
the concrete operational stage.
In a different interpretation of the Piagetian position,
Cometa and Eson argued that the comprehension of a metaphor such
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as "Man is sheep" requires the construction of an intersectional
class which consists of the shared attributes of the two distinct
classes "man" and "sheep." Intersectional classification is more
complex than additive or multiplicative cross-classification,
because it requires focusing on a specific subset of the total
classification matrix (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964). Accordingly,
intersectional classification is not mastered until the later
phase of concrete operations. It follows that metaphor
comprehension should not emerge until the child reaches the later
phase of concrete operations.
To test this hypothesis, Cometa and Eson compared children's
(kindergarten to eighth grade) paraphrases and explanations of
metaphors with their performance on a battery of non-verbal
Piagetian classification tasks. Only the children who performed
well on the Piagetian classification tasks paraphrased the
metaphors, thus supporting the position that the operation of
intersectional classification is a necessary precondition for
metaphor interpretation.
The Cometa and Eson and Billow experiments illustrate the
kinds of problems encountered when trying to determine how
children's abilities in a given domain are related to their
cognitive development as measured by their performance in the
standard Piagetian tasks. Because the same child's performance
may vary widely across different concrete or formal operational
tasks, the nature of the correlation between stages of cognitive
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development and metaphor comprehension can vary a great deal
(Berzonsky, 1971; Jamison, 1977). While such variability is not
inconsistent with Piagetian theory, it does make it very
difficult to interpret the results of any study that report a
relationship between some cognitive ability and performance in a
Piagetian task (see Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983, for a further
discussion of this point).
The problem of relating metaphor comprehension to a
cognitive developmental stage becomes even harder because the
kinds of problems that arise in the assessment of concrete or
formal operations also arise in the assessment of metaphor
comprehension. For example, some have argued (Ortony, Reynolds,
& Arter, 1978; Pollio, Barlow, Fine, & Pollio, 1977; Vosniadou &
Ortony, in press) that paraphrase and explanation are poor
measures of metaphor comprehension because they impose linguistic
or metacognitive demands well in excess of those required for
metaphor comprehension alone. In a direct test of this claim,
Vosniadou and Ortony (in press) showed that six-year-old children
were more likely to interpret a metaphor correctly when they
acted out its meaning with toys than when they paraphrased it.
Children demonstrate a greater understanding of metaphor in
multiple-choice tasks than in paraphrase tasks, presumably
because the former also impose fewer linguistic and metacognitive
demands than the latter. Finally, Pollio and Pollio (1979)
obtained different estimates of children's understanding of novel
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vs. frozen figures of speech using a multiple-choice task than a
production task. As Pollio and Pollio concluded, "a proper
understanding of language (figurative and otherwise) can only
emerge from a careful analysis of a number of different and
theoretical meaningful tasks" (p. 119).
Another problem in interpreting the results of the Cometa
and Eson (1978) and Billow (1975) studies has to do with the
content of the particular metaphors employed. The metaphors that
Cometa and Eson used (such as "Sally is a noodle," "My thoughts
are twisted when I wake up," "He couldn't pay attention because
his mind was cloudy") required knowledge about psychological
states and traits, whereas the metaphors that Billow used (such
as "Hair is spaghetti," "The pond is his mirror," "She has pearly
teeth") were based on physical/perceptual similarity. Perceptual
metaphors have usually been found easier to understand than
psychological metaphors (Cicone, Gardner, & Winner, 1981). Thus,
by employing easier classification tasks than Billow and less
familiar metaphors, Cometa and Eson were able to show that
intersectional classification precedes metaphor comprehension.
Similar criticisms apply to the studies of metaphor
comprehension conducted outside the Piagetian framework (e.g.,
Asch & Nerlove, 1960; Winner et al., 1976). Also confounded in
these studies was the ability to comprehend metaphorical language
with the ability to verbally explain or paraphrase the meaning of
a metaphorical statement. Further, the metaphorical sentences
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were often presented to children in the absence of a meaningful
linguistic or situational context. Lack of an appropriate
context can cause comprehension difficulty even in adults (see
Gentner, 1977; Ortony, Reynolds, & Arter, 1978; Pollio & Pickens,
1980; Vosniadou, Ortony, Reynolds, & Wilson, 1984 for similar
arguments). In contrast, investigators who used tasks and
materials more appropriate for the knowledge level of young
children moved the evidence for metaphor comprehension prior to
age 10. Thus, Reynolds and Ortony (1980) obtained evidence of
metaphor comprehension by 7-year-olds in a multiple-choice task
in which children read stories containing metaphors and selected
the more appropriate of four continuation sentences. Nippold,
Leonard, and Kail (1984) demonstrated that 7-year-olds understood
proportional and psychological metaphors in a multiple-choice
task. Honeck, Sowry, and Voegtle (1978) showed that 7-year-old
children could understand proverbs when the proverbs were to be
matched to one of two pictures--a non-literal correct
interpretation and a foil.
Kogan, Connor, Gross, and Fava (1980) obtained evidence of
metaphor comprehension in 7-year-old children using the
Metaphoric Triads Task (MTT). This task allows three possible
pairings of pictorial stimuli, one of which can be metaphorical.
Metaphor comprehension was assessed by counting the number of
metaphoric pairings formed. Slight modifications of the MTT task
generated better levels of performance from the younger children,
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as did exhaustive pairing, feedback on the pretest items, and the
provision of verbal labels for each picture triad. Winner,
Engel, and Gardner (1980) obtained evidence of metaphor
comprehension by 6-year-olds using metaphorical sentences based
on physical/perceptual similarity, both in an explication and a
multiple-choice task. Keil (1984) showed that 5-year-old
children could explicate metaphorical sentences when the items
they compared belonged to conceptual domains the children had
already distinguished. Malgady (1977) found that 5-year-olds
were able to provide adequate explanations of similes based on
physical/perceptual similarity (e.g., "The coat is like a
shell"), a finding consistent with Billow's (1975). Finally,
Vosniadou, Ortony, Reynolds, and Wilson (1984) obtained evidence
of metaphor comprehension in 4-year-old children who enacted
their metaphor interpretations with toys.
Thus, unlike what was believed a few years ago, the most
recent evidence supports the view that the ability to understand
metaphorical language emerges well before the age of 10 or 12.
Two principal factors contributed to this change. One is the
development of better tasks to assess metaphor comprehension,
tasks that do not confound metaphor comprehension with lack of
background knowledge, metalinguistic skill, ability to comprehend
language out of context, and other variables that do not have
much to do with metaphoric understanding per se. In this
respect, research on the development of metaphoric competence has
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followed a trend similar to the development of many other
cognitive skills which have also been shown to emerge early on
when assessed with familiar materials and simple tasks. The
other factor concerns changes in our views regarding preschool
children's classification skills which were discussed in the
section on production. If young children are capable of forming
conventional categories it is plausible that they can
intentionally violate these categories or be aware of a category
violation when it occurs.
The Development of Metaphoric Understanding
The early emergence of metaphoric understanding does not
mean that this development is complete. There is great
improvement in children's ability to comprehend figurative
language during the elementary school years. Some theorists view
this development as a process consisting of two or more stages
(Asch & Nerlove, 1960; Cometa & Eson, 1978; Demorest,
Silberstein, Gardner, & Winner, 1983; Elkind, 1974; Pollio,
Barlow, Fine, & Pollio, 1977; Winner et al., 1976). Usually
during the first stage children are thought to interpret
figurative language literally. Only after this literal stage are
there more sophisticated attempts to interpret metaphorical
language.
According to Cometa and Eson (1978), the literal stage is
followed by two other "distinct stages": paraphrase and
explanation. Paraphrase presupposes functioning at the Piagetian
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concrete operational stage, while explanation presupposes
functioning at the stage of formal operations. Asch and Nerlove
(1960) argue that there are three steps in children's
understanding of double-function terms (such as, sweet, hard,
bright): first children interpret double-function terms to refer
only to concrete objects, then the psychological sense of these
words develops as a separate vocabulary item, and finally the
realization of their double-function property comes last. Winner
et al. (1976) propose four steps in the development of metaphoric
understanding (magical, metonymic, primitive metaphoric, and
metaphoric), while Demorest, Silberstein, Gardner, and Winner
(1983) propose a three-step model. First children fail to
recognize the discrepancy between what speakers say and what they
mean, thus interpreting figurative language literally. Second,
the discrepancy between what is said and what is meant is
recognized but children are unable to identify the speaker's
purpose. Third, the speaker's intention can finally be
understood.
A strict interpretation of the stage view of metaphoric
development is inconsistent with the variability observed in the
metaphor comprehension ability of the same child (Ackerman, 1984;
Keil, 1984; Vosniadou et al., 1984). The same 5-year-old
children in Keil's (1984) experiment could adequately explain the
meaning of some metaphorical expressions (i.e., "The car was
dead") but not others (i.e., "The idea bloomed"). Similarly, the
same 4-year-old children could correctly enact the same
metaphorical sentences under some circumstances (more probable
contexts, fewer metaphorical substitutions, etc.) but not others
in the Vosniadou, et al., 1984 experiments. These findings are
inconsistent with a stage view of the development of metaphor
comprehension, since such a theory would place these children
simultaneously in both the literal and the non-literal stage of
metaphor comprehension! Stage accounts of metaphor comprehension
do not take into consideration that children's (and adults')
ability to understand metaphorical language is influenced by
variables such as their prior knowledge, the context in which the
metaphor occurs, and the linguistic complexity of the
metaphorical input. Therefore, they fail to account for the fact
that the same child may be able to understand some metaphors but
not others, or understand the same metaphor in some contexts or
tasks but not others.
In criticizing the stage theory views of the development of
metaphoric understanding we do not mean to ignore the fact that
there is a tendency in young children, a tendency that decreases
with age, to interpret metaphorical language literally. This may
be the case because children's limited knowledge of the world
does not help them place adequate boundaries between the possible
and the impossible, or the real and the imaginary. Young
children are more likely to believe that a prison guard can turn
into stone or that sweet people actually taste sweet. In
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addition, literal interpretations of metaphors are often
influenced by pretend-play. In our experiments children
interpreted action metaphors like "The little girl was a bird
flying to its nest" to mean that the little girl pretended to act
like a bird by flopping her arms up and down. This is not
surprising in view of the amount of time preschoolers spend on
pretend-play and adds to our previous arguments that pretend play
is different from metaphor.
In the most recent psychological literature metaphor
comprehension is conceptualized as a continuous process which
starts very early and develops gradually to encompass a greater
variety of metaphorical linguistic inputs (Ackerman, 1984;
Gentner & Stuart, 1983; Johnson, 1983; Keil, 1984; Vosniadou,
1985; Winner, Windmueller, Rosenblatt, Bosco, Best, & Gardner,
1985). The development of metaphor comprehension is constrained
primarily by limitations in children's conceptual knowledge,
linguistic skill, and information processing ability. That is
why one can find evidence of metaphor comprehension in very young
children if the metaphors used are simple and if they occur in an
appropriate context. What develops, according to this view, is
the ability to understand more complex metaphorical inputs in a
variety of linguistic and situational contexts.
Variables Affecting the Complexity of the Metaphor Comprehension Task
In any developmental account of metaphor comprehension one
must identify some of the critical variables that affect
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comprehension and show how these variables interact with the
developing abilities of the child. The following discussion will
be focused on how the development of metaphor comprehension may
be affected by four such specific variables: (a) the linguistic
form in which the metaphorical statement is expressed, (b) the
linguistic and pragmatic context in which it occurs, (c) the
difficulty of the metaphor comprehension task, and (d) the
content of the metaphor.
Form. Metaphorical expressions can take on many different
linguistic forms, and it appears that some of these forms are
easier to understand than others. This may be particularly true
for young children whose knowledge of the language is limited.
For example, it has been argued (Ortony, 1979; Reynolds & Ortony,
1980) that some of the difficulties young children have with
metaphors may arise not from their inability to understand non-
literal similarity but from their failure to interpret the
predicative statement as an implicit comparison. Similes require
the ability to understand non-literal similarity but impose fewer
demands on children's linguistic and information processing
abilities than metaphors, since they are explicit comparisons.
Therefore, similes should be easier for young children to
understand than metaphors.
This hypothesis has been supported by some empirical
evidence (e.g., Reynolds & Ortony, 1980; Vosniadou et al., 1984)
but not by other (Winner, Engel, & Gardner, 1980; Vosniadou &
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Ortony, in press). Reynolds and Ortony found that there is an
interaction between the form in which a non-literal linguistic
input is expressed (i.e., similes vs. metaphors) and age. While
children below 6-years-old usually find similes easier to
understand than metaphors, this is not necessarily the case for
older children.
Winner, Engel, and Gardner (1980) investigated the effect of
the form of a metaphorical statement on 6-, 7- and 9-year-old
children's performance in an explication task and a multiple-
choice task. The same metaphorical sentences were presented in
five different forms: (a) predicative metaphors ("The sky
writing was a scar marking the sky"), (b) similes ("The sky
writing was like a scar marking the sky"), (c) topicless
metaphors ("A scar marked the sky"), (d) quasi-analogies ("A scar
marks the skin like skywriting marks the sky"), and (e) riddles
("What is like a scar but marks the sky?"). The results
supported the hypothesis that linguistic form affects metaphor
comprehension. For instance, the riddles were found the easiest
of all the forms to explicate, a finding attributed to the fact
that the riddle is a more familiar linguistic form, while
analogies were easier or as easy to understand than the topicless
metaphors, a finding attributed to the explicitness of their
metaphorical grounds.
To summarize, it appears that there are certain linguistic
factors, such as familiarity with the linguistic form,
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explicitness of the metaphoric comparison, explicitness of the
metaphorical grounds, which can facilitate metaphor
comprehension. Exactly how linguistic form affects metaphor
comprehension may differ, however, depending on how it interacts
with other factors--such as the age of the children, the metaphor
comprehension task, and the content of the metaphor. At this
point we know very little about such interactions.
Context. If context plays an important role in the
comprehension of literal uses of language, it does even more so
in the comprehension of non-literal uses of language. In the
latter instance, contextual information is often indispensible to
help the reader/listener establish the connection between what is
said and what is meant. Context not only can provide a clue to
the fact that a given sentence must be interpreted metaphorically
(since a literal interpretation would not make sense), it can
also provide important information regarding the metaphor's
possible meaning. Since young children have limited conceptual
and linguistic knowledge, it is natural to assume that they
depend heavily on contextual information to interpret
metaphorical language. In fact, it may be the case that metaphor
comprehension is originally achieved only in situations where the
already established context strongly leads to inferences that are
consistent with the metaphor's implied meaning.
The role of contextual information on metaphor comprehension
has been investigated by Vosniadou et al. (1984) and Ackerman
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(1984). In the Vosniadou et al. experiments, children acted out
short stories which concluded with a metaphorical sentence,
describing more or less predictable outcome given the established
context. The predictability of the metaphorical sentences was
assessed on the basis of a control group in which children were
read the stories without the concluding sentences and acted out
their own endings. The more predictable metaphorical sentences
were easier to enact than the less predictable ones, confirming
the hypothesis that preschool children are capable of using
contextual information to draw inferences about a metaphor's
possible meaning.
While this research has demonstrated that an appropriate
linguistic and situational context can facilitate the
comprehension of metaphor, many questions remain unanswered.
What are children's abilities to integrate various contextual
cues, including both situational and linguistic information and
how do they develop? Can young children revise an original
interpretation of a metaphor when new and contradictory evidence
is presented? Are young children more sensitive to a
situational/pragmatic, than a linguistic context? When do
children start to understand metaphors in the absence of any
contextual information or in the presence of a context that is
neutral or inconsistent with respect to the metaphor's meaning?
More research is needed to clarify these questions which are
relevant not only to a developmental account of metaphor
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comprehension but to a developmental account of language
comprehension in general.
Difficulty of the comprehension task. Task demands
obviously affect our perception of a child's metaphoric
competence. Paraphrase and explication are more difficult than
multiple-choice tasks or tasks requiring acting out the
metaphor's meaning, presumably because they have greater
linguistic and metacognitive requirements. The difficulty of a
metaphor comprehension task can also increase by the simultaneous
addition of variables that may cause comprehension difficulty
(such as a less familiar linguistic form, lack of a situational
or linguistic context, or a complex metaphorical ground). For
example, four-year-olds are capable of understanding predicative
metaphors when they occur in a relative probable context but not
when they occur in a less probable context, unless the
predicative metaphors are changed into similes. Similes are in
turn understood in less probable contexts only when one
metaphorical substitution is required. Increasing the number of
metaphorical substitutions results in comprehension difficulties
for four-year-old children (Vosniadou et al., 1984).
What seems to matter, particularly for preschool children,
is not any particular source of comprehension difficulty (similes
or predicative metaphors, more or less probable contexts, or
number of metaphorical substitutions, etc.), but the overall
complexity of the metaphor comprehension task as measured by the
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combination of difficulty sources. With age, children become
able to deal with more complex metaphor comprehension tasks.
This could be the result of a developmental change in information
processing capacity (Pascual-Leone, 1970) or the result of
increased knowledge and improved strategies (Brown, 1978; Chi,
1978).
Content. There is little doubt that the content of a
metaphorical statement is an important determiner of
comprehension. Both children and adults would find it difficult
to understand metaphors that compare items they know little
about, although knowledge of the metaphorical vehicle appears to
be more important than knowledge of the topic. Metaphors are
often used to introduce an unfamiliar concept in terms of a
familiar one; in these cases knowledge of the vehicle is, of
course, critical for comprehension.
To understand a metaphor children must not only know the
words used, they must also have the concepts the words denote,
and be aware of the multiplicity of conceptual relations which
can form the grounds of a metaphorical statement. Such
conceptual knowledge is particularly important for any
developmental account of metaphor comprehension. Children not
only have fewer concepts than adults but the knowledge of many of
the concepts they have may be incomplete or biased.
One of the consistent findings in the metaphor comprehension
literature is that young children find metaphors based on
physical/perceptual similarity easier to understand than
metaphors based on abstract and complex relations (e.g., Billow,
1975; Gentner & Stuart, 1983), or metaphors that use a physical
term to describe a psychological state (e.g., Cicone, Gardner, &
Winner, 1981; Winner, Rosenstiel, & Gardner, 1976). This may not
be an accidental finding. The physical/perceptual properties of
objects are very salient and, in many cases, may constitute the
child's only knowledge of the object (see Vosniadou & Ortony,
1983b for a discussion of this issue).
Findings such as these have been interpreted more broadly to
indicate that children have difficulty in seeing similarity that
holds between relational properties as compared to attributes.
This conclusion is not consistent with at least some of the
development evidence (e.g., Gentner, 1977; Holyoak, Junn, &
Billman, 1984). For example, Gentner (1977) showed that
preschoolers can correctly map relations from the domain of the
human body to trees or mountains, while Holyoak et al. (1984)
demonstrated that preschool children can see similarity between
two stories related analogically not only when this similarity is
perceptual but also when it is of a structural/relational nature.
Recently, Gentner and Stuart (1983) proposed that while
young children have some fundamental competence to make
relational mappings, they do not appear to do so consistently for
various reasons. They may lack the necessary background
knowledge, the ability to do complex mappings, or have a
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different aesthetic. According to this view, what develops with
age is the child's ability to make consistent relational mappings
between domains. This conclusion was supported by an experiment
which compared children's (5- and 9-year-old) and adults'
interpretations' based either on simple attribute properties
(i.e., "Pancakes are nickels"), relational properties (i.e., "A
camera is a tape recorder"), or both (i.e., "Plant stems are
drinking straws"). A strong developmental trend was obtained in
the use of relations but not attributes.
As Gentner and Stuart discuss, the results of this
experiment are not conclusive because the interpretation task may
have underestimated the young child's comprehension of metaphors.
Also, the relational metaphors may have placed more requirements
on the children's background knowledge than the attribute
metaphors. Consider, for example, the metaphor "Plant stems are
drinking straws." It is highly debatable whether one should
expect a 5-year-old to know that plant stems have liquids running
through them, whereas the knowledge that both plant stems and
straws are relatively tall and thin is readily available. To
test the hypothesis that children have particular difficulty with
relational similarity, we need relational and attribute metaphors
whose knowledge requirements are comparable.
Some evidence suggests that when the knowledge variable is
controlled, relational metaphors are not harder to understand
than attribute metaphors. For example, in a recent study, Dent
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(1984) showed that 5-, 7- and 10-year-old children found it
easier to perceive metaphoric similarity between moving objects
(like a ballerina dancing and a top spinning) than between
stationary objects (like a curvey river and a curvy snake).
Similar results were obtained by Calhoun (1984). Here we
interpret actions such as "dancing" and "spinning" to require
relational mappings, as they do in Gentner's (1983) structure-
mapping theory.
The claim that children may have a capacity to make
relational mappings but do not have a propensity to do so is hard
to accept because, as Verbrugge (1979) has argued, the perceptual
information for events, for linguistic structure, and for
coordinated action that young children use to make sense of the
world around them is primarily relational. Nevertheless, care
must be exercised in defining relational similarity. As Dent
(1984) notes, the distinction between perceptual similarity and
functional (action) similarity obscures the fact that similarity
in action can also be of a perceptual nature; i.e., that one
perceives action as one perceives a stationary object.
Similarity in relations based on perceptual information may be
more salient and, thus, noticed earlier than similarity in
relations that are of a conceptual nature and that do not have a
perceptual or experiential basis. Again, as was the case with
metaphor production, a theory of metaphor comprehension would
require that we know what kinds of conceptual distinctions young
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children make first, how these conceptual distinctions become
differentiated with development, and how conceptual development
influences the acquisition of metaphor.
Metaphoric Competence and Conceptual Development
At present we know little about how the development of
metaphoric competence is influenced by conceptual development.
Some of the relevant research will be described in the pages that
follow. It is important to notice, however, that while the
child's ability to produce and comprehend metaphors depends
critically on what the child already knows, metaphors can also
advance and enrich conceptual development itself. The nature of
this interaction between conceptual development and metaphoric
competence will be explored in this section.
How conceptual knowledge influences the development of
metaphoric competence. Keil (1984) attempts to answer the
question of how the child's conceptual system influences metaphor
comprehension by using the notion of the semantic field (Lehrer,
1978). A semantic field is defined as a cluster of related
concepts, and Keil suggests that metaphors involve not two terms
in isolation but the interaction of domains or semantic fields.
(This notion is similar to a proposal by Tourangeau and
Sternberg, 1982, that conceptual domains guide the production and
comprehension of metaphor.) Keil advances two specific
hypotheses regarding the acquisition of metaphorical
understanding: (a) metaphors emerge on a field-by-field basis;
that is, if one member of a semantic field becomes extended
metaphorically, so do the other members of the field; and (b)
conceptual distinctions that are acquired earlier will be the
first ones used by the child in understanding metaphors. For
instance, since the distinction between animate and inanimate
objects is acquired before that between physical and non-physical
objects, animate/inanimate metaphors should be acquired before
physical/non-physical metaphors.
Keil (1984) did an experiment in which kindergarten, second-
and fourth-grade children explained the meaning of metaphorical
sentences from different semantic fields. The results showed
that the children who understood one metaphor from a given
semantic field tended to understand all the other metaphors in
that field. In addition, the order of acquisition of the fields
corresponded with the order of acquisition of certain conceptual
distinctions noted in earlier work by Keil (1979). As expected,
metaphors based on an animate/inaminate distinction were acquired
before metaphors based on an animal/human or physical object/non-
physical object distinction. It was concluded that "children's
ability to comprehend metaphors . . ., develops on a field by
field basis, where the order of emergence of these fields is
related to other work in conceptual development" (Keil, 1984,
p. 9).
A problem with Keil's work is that the concept of semantic
field is only vaguely defined. We do not really know what a
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semantic field is, how different semantic fields are related to
each other, or to other theoretical constructs (e.g., classes,
schemas, concepts, theories), and what developmental predictions
follow from this distinction. Only a few examples are presented
and these map domains with very different internal structures,
like the semantic field of "human vocalization" terms (i.e.,
"whispered," "screamed," "moaned") and the field of animate terms
(i.e., "thirsty," "dead," and "tired"), without providing a
justification as to why these particular groupings of items form
a semantic field. Keil's approach provides some new and creative
ideas about how conceptual knowledge might influence metaphor
comprehension, but more work is needed to better define the
concepts involved and to test their empirical implications.
In another attempt to understand how a child's understanding
of metaphor is influenced by the underlying conceptual system,
first and third-grade children were read short stories containing
an analogy from a more to a less familiar domain (i.e., the
healing of an infection was described in terms of winning a war)
and answered some questions about them (Vosniadou & Ortony,
1983b). Six types of conceptual relations were identified as
possible areas of transfer from the familiar topic to the
unfamiliar vehicle: (a) descriptive properties, (b)
characteristic activities, (c) emotions and thoughts, (d)
structural and functional characteristics, (e) causal properties,,
and (f) plans and goals. While the children did not make errors
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in transferring descriptive properties and characteristic
activities, they were willing to attribute human emotions and
thoughts to inanimate things. For instance, when the children
were told that white blood cells are like soldiers, they did not
conclude that the white blood cells wear uniforms, eat breakfast,
or use guns. Even the fifth-grade students thought, however,
that white blood cells think that germs are bad and feel
frightened when they fight them. Since the children did not
transfer all possible human characteristics to blood cells but
only feelings and thoughts, one may conclude that the children
did not lack the human/animal or animate/inanimate distinction
altogether (as, for example, Keil may have argued), but only
certain aspects of this distinction.
Another interesting finding was that the transfer of
properties worked only from the domain of humans to that of
animals and blood cells, and not in the other direction. Carey
(1985) also reports that there is an asymmetry in young
children's attributions of properties to people and animals
depending on who they think has these properties. Children under
10-years-old are likely to project that animals have spleens if
they are taught that people have them, but do not project that
people have spleens if they are taught that dogs or bees have
them.
These findings suggest that the process of distinguishing
one conceptual domain from another is something that occurs over
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a long period of time, with some distinctions mastered well
before others. Thus, to understand the development of children's
comprehension and production of metaphorical language, we must
know not only which conceptual domains are distinguished before
others, but also at what level (i.e., descriptive, functional,
structural, ideational) and in what direction.
How metaphorical thinking influences the development of
conceptual knowledge. Within the framework of Piaget's theory,
metaphor has been seen as the product of the imagistic,
preconceptual thinking of the preoperational child. According to
this view, preschool children think in terms of similarity
whereas older children make deductive inferences from category
membership (see Piaget, 1962). This view has not been altogether
supported by the empirical evidence. Preschool children are
sometimes capable of making deductive inferences from category
membership when dealing with familiar domains (e.g., Gellman &
Markman, 1984; Smith, 1979). Conversely, adults also make
inferences on the basis of similarity in many cases. Much of the
research on adult human reasoning in recent years has shown that
far from operating on the basis of content-free general rules,
human reasoning is tied to particular bodies of knowledge and is
greatly influenced by the context in which it occurs (e.g., Wason
& Johnson-Laird, 1972). Certainly there is enough evidence to
show that adults often think in terms of specific cases and vivid
experiences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), or mental models
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(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Gentner & Stevens, 1983), rather than by
logical deduction from abstract principles, as Piaget claims
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958).
When knowledge is organized in a procedural, content-
dependent system, the problem of knowledge acquisition becomes a
formidable one. In an interesting discussion of the problem of
learning, Rumelhart and Norman (1981) point out that the process
of adding new knowledge to a procedurally based system is
enormously more complex than the process of adding new knowledge
to a declarative based system. In the latter case the process is
simply one of adding a new body of facts and applying the same
general inference rules to them. In the former case, however,
the inference rules are embedded within specific knowledge
domains and it is not at all easy to see how old knowledge can be
transferred to a new domain. Rumelhart and Norman argue that
what people commonly do is transfer knowledge from one domain to
another via analogical types of reasoning, and that metaphor and
analogy are important mechanisms for the acquisition of new
knowledge. Indeed, metaphors and analogies have received a lot
of attention from cognitive scientists, an interest related to
the shift from declarative to procedural models of knowledge
representations.
This work has important developmental implications. Since
children's reasoning has many of the characteristics one would
expect from a procedural system, metaphorical thinking may play
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an important role in the child's attempts to acquire new
knowledge. Indeed, all we know about early conceptual
development suggests that children from a very early age are
actively relating new information to existing knowledge via
analogical types of processes (see Mandler, 1983, for a
discussion of this issue). What we are suggesting is that
instead of conceptualizing metaphor as the product of the
imagistic, preconceptual thinking of the preschool child, we can
conceptualize it as the reflection on the linguistic medium of an
underlying transfer of knowledge from one conceptual domain to
another, similar in kind to the transfer of knowledge taking
place in adults. Such a view of metaphor makes a lot of sense
particularly in the context of domain-specific theories of
conceptual development (Carey, 1985), in which the child is seen
to begin knowledge acquisition with a few conceptual domains
which are later restructured and differentiated into new ones.
Metaphorical thinking can play an important role in such a
process because it allows children to use existing knowledge to
understand new phenomena, phenomena which are not quite similar
to anything they have experienced before (see Vosniadou & Brewer,
1985). For example, children can use their model of people to
understand animals, just like adults use their model of computers
to understand the. brain--knowing they are not quite the same
things but slowly figuring out the full range of their
differences. Also, metaphorical thinking can help children
differentiate existing knowledge into new conceptual frameworks.
For instance, seeing the body as a machine can provide a new
explanatory framework for conceptualizing body functions usually
seen by children from a psychological point of view (Carey,
1985).
Viewing metaphor as a vehicle for knowledge acquisition can
provide new insights not only about how metaphoric competence
develops, but also about cognitive development itself. Future
research in the area of metaphor could potentially make
significant contributions to cognitive developmental theory by
examining more closely the domains children spontaneously use as
metaphorical vehicles and topics, the processes whereby the
transfer of knowledge is accomplished, and the differentiation
and reorganization of existing knowledge that metaphors promote.
Conclusions
It has been argued that the development of both metaphor
production and comprehension is a continuous process rather than
one characterized by stages and that it is primarily constrained
by limitations in children's knowledge and information processing
abilities. More specifically, it has been suggested that
metaphor production develops out of children's undifferentiated
similarity notions which become differentiated into literal and
nonliteral similarity judgments as their conceptual knowledge
becomes organized in categories similar to those of adults.
Similarly, metaphor comprehension starts during the preschool
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years, is originally limited to a few metaphorical expressions
which occur in predictable linguistic and situational contexts,
but develops rapidly to encompass a greater variety of
metaphorical domains as children's knowledge and information
processing abilities increase.
Finally, it has been suggested that child metaphors are a
reflection on the language of an underlying transfer of knowledge
from one conceptual domain to another similar to the kind of
transfer of knowledge occurring in adults. Such a view of
metaphor is consistent with domain-specific theories of
conceptual development which claim that children begin by
acquiring knowledge in a few domains which is later
differentiated or transferred to other domains. Thus, while a
complete understanding of how metaphoric competence develops
requires an understanding of how conceptual domains develop and
become differentiated, the study of the development of metaphoric
competence can also enrich our understanding of conceptual
development itself. Future research in the area of metaphoric
competence would have to say more not only about how metaphor
production and comprehension develop but also about the transfer
and reorganization of conceptual knowledge that metaphors
promote.
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Footnote
lOne such case is the statement "Chicago is the New York of
the Midwest," which appears to be metaphorical although it
juxtaposes two items (Chicago and New York) which do not belong
to different conventional categories (both are cities). What is
really juxtaposed in this metaphor, however, is not "Chicago vs.
New York," but "cities of the Midwest vs. cities of the East."
That this is true becomes evident if we consider that the
statement "Chicago is New York" is meaningless. In order to make
a metaphor, the speaker must provide information to the listener
about the relevant category which is being violated--in this
case, Chicago as a city of the Midwest vs. New York as a city of
the East.


